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WITTGENSTEIN'S POKER: CONTESTED
CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND THE LIMITS OF PUBLIC MEANING
ORIGINALISM
IAN C. BARTRUM
ABSTRACT
Constitutionaloriginalism is much in the news as our new President
fills the Supreme Court vacancy Antonin Scalia's death has created.
"Public meaning" originalism is probably the most influential version of
originalism in current theoretical circles. This essay argues that, while
these "New Originalists" have thoughtfully escaped some of the
debilitating criticisms leveled against their predecessors, the result is a
profoundly impoverished interpretive methodology that has little to offer
most modern constitutionalcontroversies. In particular,the fact that our
constitutional practices are contested-that is, we often do not seek
semantic or legal agreement-makes particularlinguistic indeterminacies
highly problematicfor approachesgroundedin historicalpublic meaning.
Here I highlight two underappreciatedsources of such indeterminacy:
intentional contemporary ambiguity and incidental evolutionary
vagueness. Neither of these indeterminaciesare susceptible to the New
Originalist method, and, when added to the well-known problem of
intentional vagueness, these issues leave public meaning originalism
incapableof constrainingjudges in many of our most controversialcases.
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INTRODUCTION

In March of 2013, Senators Ted Cruz and Dianne Feinstein had a "testy
exchange" in the Senate Judiciary Committee over a proposal to renew the
assault weapons ban of 2004.2 Senator Cruz, a Harvard educated lawyer
and former Supreme Court clerk, seemingly hoped to overwhelm Senator
Feinstein with a constitutional argument. He first reminded Feinstein of the
need to respect our "foundational document" and the framers' intentions in
drafting the Bill of Rights.3 He then drew a parallel between the "right of
the people" announced in the Second Amendment and the same language in
the First and Fourth Amendments.4 He went on to ask if Feinstein would
be comfortable if Congress limited free speech by banning particular books,
or if the courts protected only "specified people" from unreasonable
searches. Cruz's rhetorical assumption, of course, was that Feinstein could
never approve of such restrictions on speech or privacy.
On the surface, Senator Cruz's efforts were fairly unpersuasive as a
matter of constitutional argument. After all, almost no one conceives of
First or Fourth Amendment protections as absolute. The analogy between
assault weapons and searches of "specific people" is simply inapt. The ban
would target particular weapons; thus the appropriate analog is to particular
searches, not people. More interestingly, his basic point that the textual
similarity between the three amendments played upon an intentional
ambiguity in the original constitutional text. Akhil Amar, among others,
noted that "the people" identified in the Second Amendment were actually
a subset of the larger group contemplated in the First and Fourth.' The latter
held what were known as "civil" rights in the 1 8 th century, while the former
was a smaller group that enjoyed full "political" rights. Women, for
example, had the "civil" right to speak, even if they could not exercise the
"political" rights to vote, serve on juries, or-apropos here-join the militia
or bear arms.6 It turns out, then, that the term "the people" had ambiguous
constitutional usages at the time of ratification. In 2013, this ambiguity

2 Jennifer Steinhauer, Panel Votes to Renew Assault Weapons Ban, But Prospects in Full Senate

Are Dim, N.Y. TIMES A17 (Mar. 15, 2013). Video of the exchange is available on YouTube.
MichaelSavage4Prez, Ted Cruz & Dianne Feinstein Explosive Debate Over Gun Control In Senate: 'I

Am NotA 6th Grader',YOuTUBE (Mar. 14, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v-PWsKJiyesVU.
IJon Healey, Sens. Ted Cruz and Dianne Feinstein Face Off on Gun Control, L.A. TIMES (Mar.
15, 2003) http:// articles.latimes.com/2013/ mar/I 5/news/la-ol-sens-ted-cruz-and-dianne-feinstein-face-

off-on-gun-control-2013 0315.
4
id.
"E.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The SecondAmendment as a Case Study in ConstitutionalInterpretation,

2001 UTAH L. REv. 889, 892-896 (2001).
6 Id.
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allowed Cruz to maintain his originalist pretensions while making a nonoriginalist claim regarding the text.
Ambiguities of this sort-what I call in this essay "intentional
contemporary ambiguities"'-present a substantial challenge to "original
public meaning" accounts of constitutional interpretation. In particular,
New Originalist theories, which claim that we can "fix" or determine the
text's original "communicative content" as an empirical matter,8 seem illequipped to account for circumstances when the drafters intentionally made
use of ambiguities in existing language conventions to further contested
political ends. This difficulty arises, in part, because the New Originalists
have sworn off "Intentionalism" and now look solely to "original public
meaning" as the touchstone of constitutional semantics.' As a result, there
is no longer any recourse to the drafters' intentions in resolving the question
of which "people" held which rights. The relevant historical language
conventions, of course, recognized both meanings of the word, and it is
difficult to see how pragmatic or contextual enrichment (at least based on
generalized concepts of public meaning) could provide a definitive answer.
Such a case, then, is evidence that deriving the text's communicative
content may require recourse to authorial intent, and thus may demand both
historical and contemporary construction.
More importantly, the phenomenon of intentional contemporary
ambiguity helps to illustrate the particular kinds of interpretive problems
that can arise within a contested language practice. Even under the best of
conditions there are real problems with the notion that communicative
content might be empirically fixed and transported through time into
different language practiceso This is because the semantic meaning of

An indeterminacy may be either (1) contemporary or evolutionary; and it may be either (2)
intentional or incidental. The first distinction addresses whether constitutional text is indeterminate
when ratified, or becomes indeterminate as practices evolve. The second recognizes that indeterminacies
may be intentional or unintentional. Contentional contemporary ambiguity and incidental vagueness
demonstrate the indeterminacy of New Originalism.

8 Per the New Originalists, constitutional explication takes place in two distinct phases: (1)
Interpretation-in which we discover the text's "communicative content"; and (2) Construction-in
which we construe the text's "legal meaning" in the context of some modem controversy. The first
phase seeks to "fix" the text's "original public meaning" at the moment of ratification. We then carry
this meaning into the construction phase, where it constrains our conclusions about the text's legal
content, absent weighty countervailing reasons. See generally Lawrence B. Solum, The InterpretationConstructionDistinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95 (2011).
9 Lawrence B. Solum, THE FIXATION THESIS: THE ROLE OF HISTORICAL FACT IN ORIGINAL

MEANING, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 26-27 (2015). Of course, not all originalists have abandoned
intentionalism-which at least seems to ask the right questions about linguistic meaning.

See Larry

Alexander, Originalism, the Why and the What, 82 FORD. L. REV. 539 (2013) (arguing that interpretation
is about trying to discover authorial intent).
'o E.g., Ian Bartrum, Two Dogmas of Originalism, 7 WASH. U. JURIS. REV. 157, 172-75 (2015).
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language transposed into an alien communicative culture can arise only out
of analysis, construction, and contextualization-or, as this process is often
called in other contexts, translation. All of the constructive difficulties
present in ideal translative endeavors-those where all of the stakeholders
want to agree on a meaning, without preconceptions about what that
meaning should be-are multiplied many times when the parties do not seek
agreement, but rather hope to maximize their own argumentative
advantages.
The fact that our constitutional practice involves this sort of contested
translation has at least three entailments for interpretation. First, because
the relationship between historical text and modem semantics is practical
and constructive in nature, it may require an inquiry into intentions, and thus
it may not be a matter of "empirical" discovery. Second, the problem of
contemporary ambiguity demonstrates that this sort of linguistic uncertainty
is not limited to cases of vagueness; and, indeed, public meaning accounts
may not have the resources to address intentional contemporary
ambiguities." Third, once these types of contested indeterminacies have
slipped their nose into the semantic tent, we must reconcile ourselves to the
full, rich spectrum of practical linguistic complexity that may arise in
nontrivial cases of constitutional contestation. Or, as Karl Llewellyn
famously observed of the common law, "Every single precedent, according
to what may be the attitude of future judges, is ambiguous."l 2 If this is true,
then both the text's communicative and legal content are necessarily the
product of an ongoing constructive argument. This need not, however,
arouse deep anxieties about unfettered judicial activism. Indeed, it is the
adversarial contest itself-not some idealized interpretive orthodoxy or
posited "law of interpretation"-that most effectively constrains
constitutional judges. We should thus embrace our differences in all of their
vigor, nuance, and uncertainty. 13 As James Madison observed long ago, a
zealous diversity of opinions and interests better safeguards our democratic
institutions and liberties than mere "parchment barriers" ever could. 14

" Larry Solum has at least recognized this possibility, but has not-to my knowledge-attempted
to resolve it definitively.

See Id. at 102 (characterizing this as a problem of "irreducible ambiguity");

accordId. at 107, n. 25 ("My view is that ambiguities can usually be resolved by interpretation [on the
basis of the context of the utterance], although it is at least theoretically possible that some ambiguities

cannot be so resolved.").
12 K. N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 71 (1951).
13 But see William Baude & Stephen Sachs, The Law ofInterpretation, 130 HARv. L. REv. 1079

(2017); William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law, 115 COLUM. L. REv. 2349 (2015).
14 THE FEDERALIST NOS. 10, 48 (James Madison) 38, 333 (Jacob E. Cooke, ed., 1961). The famous
phrase "mere 'parchment barriers' here underscores the relative weakness of textual, as opposed to
structural, constraints on institutional power.
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This essay argues that the entailments of understanding constitutional
language as a contested practice substantially undermine the quest for
judicial constraints grounded in empirical original public meanings. Again,
the search for historical meaning (or communicative content) is difficult
enough when the relevant speakers and all of the interpretive stakeholders
are actually trying, in good faith, to come to a semantic agreement." Those
empirical difficulties become exponentially more acute-sometimes
irresolvable-when both speakers and stakeholders actively exploit
communicative doubt or indeterminacy in order to further contested ends.1 6
This argument leans heavily on Ludwig Wittgenstein's later philosophy,
which is enigmatic and controverted in its own right-so much so that there
is some disagreement about whether he can teach us anything useful about
legal interpretation." I remain convinced, however, that a reasonably
straightforward application of Wittgenstein's most fundamental and least
controversial ideas offers important insights into the limits of a written
constitution as source of determinate or objective semantic meanings. I
argue that in our contested constitutional context two underappreciated
types of indeterminacy-intentional contemporary ambiguity and
incidental evolutionary vagueness-present substantial problems for
original public meaning as a source of empirical interpretive constraint.
When added to the problem of intentional vagueness-which the New
Originalists already largely concede to modem construction-these
indeterminacies impose significant limitations on the practical normativity
of public meaning originalism.'"

" Much of Wittgenstein's work on language is an effort to show how the remarkable feat of
semantic agreement is possible even among contemporaneous speakers. Brian H. Bix, Legal
Interpretationand the Philosophy of Language, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LANGUAGE AND LAW
145, 147 (Peter M. Tiersma & Lawrence M. Solan, eds. 2012).
6 This point is perhaps analogous to that which Scott Shapiro makes in discussing disagreements
in conceptual analysis of the nature of "law." See Scorr J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 17 (Harvard Belknap,
2011). When ambiguities in reference confound our analytic efforts, Shapiro reasons, a conflict may be
irresolvable: "If so, conceptual analysis of law would not be possible because there would be no object
to which we are all referring when we use the word "law." Id.
" See, e.g., Michael Steven Green, Dworkin's Fallacy, Or What the Philosophy ofLanguage Can't
Teach Us About the Law, 89 VA. L. REv. 1897 (2003); see also Stefano Bertea, Remarks on a Legal
PositivistMisuse of Wittgenstein 's Later Philosophy, 22 LAW & PHIL. 513 (2003).
8 It is true that much of the Constitution is reasonably determinate and infrequently uncontested.
That is so, I suggest, because most--if not all-of the accepted forms of constitutional interpretation
converge on a stable and shared meaning of that text. Public meaning originalism, of course, may
provide some practical normativity in such "easy cases," but so do most other methodologies. What I
claim here is that public meaning originalism can rarely provide definitive normative grounds for
deciding between divergent interpretive approaches in a robust constitutional contest.
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I. LANGUAGE As A GAME
Perhaps Wittgenstein's most famous claim is that speaking a language
is like playing a game.' 9 Indeed, as a German speaker, he happily captured
the idea in a word mash-up-"Sprachspiel"---or, in English, "language
game." 20 He hoped this would "bring into prominence the fact that the
speaking of a language is part of an activity, or a form of life." 2 1 Or, to put
it another way, language is something we do, not something that we have.22
Further, like a game, language is a rule-governed activity; which is to say
that it is rules, not instruments (e.g. pieces or balls) that give a particular
action or utterance a particular "meaning."23 While this point may seem
fairly obvious in the context of a chess match or football game, Wittgenstein
observed that philosophers (including himself) had often confused these
ideas when analyzing language.24 They mistakenly assumed that words, not
rules, produce linguistic meanings.2 5 He hoped that the game comparison
would remove this confusion, so that we might more clearly see that
"[w]ords and chess pieces are analogous; knowing how to use a word is like
knowing how to move a chess piece. ... [Thus the] meaning of a word is to
be defined by the rules for its use."26
The importance of this insight may seem a bit obscure until we reflect
upon the entailments of the classical idea that words "represent" objects in
the world, and that it is these associated objects that define a word's
meaning.27 While this may be roughly true of some words used for some
purposes-perhaps some nouns and names-it is certainly not true of all, or
even most, words.28 With this mistaken "representationalist" premise in
mind, however, it is easy to see why many people have believed we could
determine a word's meaning by discovering "facts" about what it signifies

19 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS §23 (Blackwell German-English ed.,
2007) [hereinafter INVESTIGATIONS].
20 Id.
21 Iid.
22

Indeed, Philip Bobbitt has made precisely the same claim about "law."

PHILIP BOBBITT,

CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 24 (Blackwell, 1991).
23 WITrGENSTEIN'S LECTURES: CAMBRIDGE, 1932-1935 Pt. 1, § 2 (Alice Ambrose, ed., 1972)
[hereinafter LECTURES].
24 INVESTIGATIONS, §§ 1-3.
25 Id.

26 LECTURES, PT. 1, § 2.
27 INVESTIGATIONS, §§ 1-3. Wittgenstein's own such account-set out in his earlier
Tractatus-

Logico Philosophicus-claimedthat words represented "simples", and that sentences depicted some
arrangement or relationship between these basic elements.
28 Id. § 1. Even the meaning of these sorts of words does not depend upon a relationship to
something in the world-we can understand the meaning of "dragon" even if none exist; and "Napoleon

Bonaparte" still has meaning long after the man's death.
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in the world. Indeed, Wittgenstein suggested that this sort of confusion
about a word's "empirical" or "foundational" meaning has given rise to
many, if not all, of the great philosophical questions.29 For example, Plato
notwithstanding, the word "justice" lacks foundational meaning; it is just a
piece used according to the rules of various language games.3 0 Essentially,
for Wittgenstein, such puzzles actually reduce to confusions about language
usage, or as he famously put it: "Philosophical problems arise when
language goes on holiday."31
An analogy to card games may help to illustrate these basic ideas. It is
easy to see that the cards in a standard American deck have no meaning in
and of themselves. Like a chess piece, a card's meaning derives from the
various uses to which a player may put it according to the rules of a given
game. Unlike chess pieces, however, the cards have different meanings
across a wide variety of games-and this in turn makes cards more readily
analogous to words and language games.32 Still, the card analogy does not
quite capture all the complexity of language, because the rules of language
games generally evolve more quickly than do the rules of card games. That
is, the rules of language games-and thus the meaning of words-are
always changing as our forms of life change, and so the competent player
must play along alertly in order to remain fluent. One might imagine, as an
illustration, a hermit who shut himself away in 1980 and spoke to no one
until 2017. Many words would now have uses (and thus meanings) that he
would not understand. "Text," for example, has evolved into a verb.
The card analogy also makes it clear why the cards themselves have no
foundational meaning: It is because there is nothing in the world which the
ten of Spades (for example) represents, which could allow us to identify its
meaning as a matter of empirical "fact." Thus, contemplating a card's
foundational meaning is as nonsensical and futile as were ancient efforts to
define "the Good" once and for all. To understand the meaning of the ten
of Spades, it turns out, is simply to have the practical ability to play that
card appropriately within a particular game at a particular time and place. 33

29 See Robert Fogelin, "Wittgenstein's Critique of Philosophy," THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO

wlfrGENSTEIN 34, 37-48 (Hans Sluga & David G. Stem, eds., 1996).
3o See, PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, BK 1 (327 A-353 D) in GREAT DIALOGUES OF PLATO (W.H.D.
Rouse, trans. 1956) (exploring meaning of word "justice"). This, of course, does not entail that "justice"
has no meaning; simply that its meaning is a product of particularized and contextual nule following,
and not a reference to some immutable form.
31 Id. § 38; see also Fogelin, supra note 29.

32

One could, of course, imagine new games played with chess pieces in which the pieces take on

new meanings.
33 See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, ON CERTAINTY §§ 61-62 (G.E.M. Anscombe & G.H. von Wright

eds., Denis Paul & G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 1969) [hereinafter ON CERTAINTY].

2017]

WITTGENSTEIN'S POKER: CONTESTED CONSTITUTIONALISM

37

While we might argue that the rules of a game ought to be otherwise than
they are-and our efforts may even succeed in modifying future games-it
is idle to claim that a play recognized as appropriate in an existing game is
invalid based upon some empirical truth about what the card refers to in the
world.34 Again, the card does not refer to anything empirically verifiableand so there is, as some would have it, no there, there.35 What the card does
do is ask us to follow certain rules with set criteria in order to participate in
a shared social practice.
This of course means that any inquiry into meaning must focus not on
the cards, but on the rules. Here, again, it is important to recognize that
most card games (or languages) do not rely on a "rulebook" to establish
foundational principles or meanings.36 The rules are simply a matter of
lived practice, passed on from one person to another one game at a timewhich is why, as Wittgenstein pointed out, "it has no meaning to say that a
game has always been played wrong."3 7 It is true that there are often broad
convergences in those practices, so that two people who have never met
might successfully play a game of Gin. But it is also true that there may
be variations in the ways that each of these people has learned to play the
game-"We play it this way at home"-that may leave gaps in the shared
practice. In such cases, the players will simply have to work out these
inconsistencies as they go along, setting precedents for future play as they
move forward. In Wittgenstein's words, "Not only rules, but examples are
needed for establishing a practice. Our rules leave loop-holes open, and the
practice has to speak for itself." 39 This is why Gin-but even more acutely
language-is something we do, and keep doing in ever-evolving ways, and
not something that we have in a foundational sense.

3 See, e.g., Id. § 496.
* But see Randy Barnett, The GravitationalForce of Originalism, 82 FORD. L. REv. 411, 416
("[WIhen confronting conflicting interpretive claims about meaning there is (A la Gertrude Stein) a there
there potentially to resolve the conflict."). Again, the point is not that a card (or word) cannot have a
determinate meaning-and in this sense refer to a "there"-but rather that we must establish this
meaning practically- thus contingentl-and not empirically.
3 One might be tempted here to point to dictionaries or books that provide instruction on how to
play various card games. Upon closer examination, however, it becomes clear that these sorts of books
are ex post descriptionsof the way that a particular game was played at a particular time or place. They

do not, in themselves, constitute the rules of play, nor do they establish how the game will be played in
the future. To draw an analogy to the legal world, such sources are something like the Restatements of
the common law.
3ON CERTAINTY, supra note 33, at § 496.
3 It was, in fact, largely for the existence of these broad convergences-yielding fairly determinate
meanings-that Wittgenstein hoped to account. Brian H. Bix, Legal Interpretationand the Philosophy
ofLanguage, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LANGUAGE AND LAW 147 (Lawrence M. Solan & Peter M
Tiersma, eds. 2012).
' ON CERTAINTY, supra note 33, at § 139.
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Public meaning originalists seem to suggest that we might take a kind
of snapshot of a language game at a particular moment in time, discover the
rules that governed play at that moment, and then treat those abstracted rules
as something like "facts" that can define practical meanings-at least for an
instant in time. 40 This view accepts, in other words, that words get their
meaning from rules, not objects, but then claims that we can treat these rules
as though they were objects that we might discover and study empirically. 4 1
In this way, we might try to play a language game "as it was played" at some
discrete historical moment. The card game analogy reveals, however, that
this approach simply replicates the representationalist fallacy at a higher
level of abstraction. Rules are decidedly not facts, not just because they are
not objects, but because rules exist as interdependent parts of a lived
practice-a form of life-in which they are embedded: To repeat a theme,
rules (both linguistic and legal) are something we do, not something we
have. In the case of language, it makes no sense to "play a game as it was
played" when the worldly circumstances that gave rise to its particular
interlocking rule structures have disappeared, so that no one plays it that
way anymore.42 To do so is actually to play a wholly new language game,
which may or may not have practical value inasmuch as it serves a new form
of life with different communicative purposes.43
To illustrate the point, imagine that someone has done an empirical
study of all the rules of all the variations of Gin played between 1820 and
1830. Based on this research, she is able to conclude that a player could
generally use the ten of Spades as a wild card in certain sets or runs. Now
fast forward to 1940, and assume that the rules of Gin have evolved so that
wild cards are no longer an accepted part of the game-in fact, the very
concept of a "wild card" is widely condemned as part of a watered down
and regrettable period in Gin's history. Now, not only has the ten of Spades
lost some of the meaning it had in 1825, but the "wild" aspect of the older

' Thus, Larry Solum has argued: "[W]hen we disagree about [semantic content] we are disagreeing
about linguistic facts. In principle, there is a fact of the matter about what the linguistic content is."
Lawrence Solum, A Reader's Guide To Semantic Originalism and a Reply to Professor Griffin 13
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1 130665.
This also seems to be the import of the "corpus
linguistics" movement in constitutional theory. See Lawrence M. Solan, Can Corpus Linguistics Help
Make OriginalismScientific?, 126 YALE. L. J. FORUM 57 (2016).
41 See, e.g., Barnett, GravitationalForce, supra note 35, at 415-17.
42 For an exceptionally insightful historian's take on this issue, lamenting the lack of "holism" and
"historicism" in New Originalist efforts at historical translation, see Jonathan Gienapp, Historicismand
Holism: Failuresof*OriginalistTranslation, 84 FoRD. L. REv. 935, 941-44 (2015).
43 For those constitutional theorists who make this sort of claim, it seems the larger hope is that our
current legal practices (or games) might be constrained in ways that they now are not. See, e.g., Solum,
supra note 9. This would presumably serve our current form of life by reining in activist judges of a
particular sort.
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ten of Spades no longer fits within the game's broader norms. Thus, not
only has playing the card this way become meaningless or "nonsense," but
any attempt to do so in 1940 would reveal a player's pass6 understanding of
Gin." This is what Wittgenstein means when he says language games are
part of a particular form of life.45 Indeed, in some ways the attempt to play
the old ten of Spades in the new game is something like trying to use the
Newtonian terms "mass" and "force" to solve a problem posed in
Einsteinian physics.4 6
All this sort of empirical study can show, then, is that given the
particular circumstances of a particular world at a particular time, most
people played Gin in a particular way. And, in the case of a language game,
it is the particular cultural circumstances of that moment-the practical
communicative problems that the game arose to solve-which produced the
historical rules and meanings. When that cultural or circumstantial
paradigm ceased to exist, so did the practice that gave it meaning. At most,
we might achieve a kind of translation between older and newer forms of
life-so long as we recognize two fundamental points: (1) Translation is
always a constructive activity; and (2) as with Newtonian and Einsteinian
physics, some important ideas simply will not translate.47
To put this critically important point in more expressly Wittgensteinian
terms, a given term-"commerce," for example-bears only a "family

" Brian Bix hints at this point in discussing Wittgenstein's earlier efforts to analyze problems of
linguistic "verification": "Conventional meanings assume usual circumstances." Brian H. Bix, Legal
Interpretationand the Philosophy ofLanguage, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LANGUAGE AND LAW
150 (Lawrence M. Solan & Peter M Tiersma, eds. 2012). When circumstances change, in other words,

so do meanings.
45 INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 19, § 23.
46 Thomas Kuhn has famously pointed

out that such an effort is meaningless because the
Newtonian and Einsteinian physical paradigms are incommensurable. Thomas S. Kuhn, Rationalityand
Theory Choice, 80 J. PHIL. 563, 566 (1983). Or, as Michael Polanyi has put it, scientists in different
schools "think differently, speak a different language, live in a different world." MICHAEL POLANYI,
PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE: TOWARDS A POST-CRITICAL

PHILOSOPHY

151

(1958).

The

same

incommensurability exists, as Wittgenstein pointed out, across different language games-including
language games played at different times as part of different "forms of life." This is what he means
when he says, "If a lion could talk, we could not understand him." INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 19, at
223.47

Again, Jonathan Gienapp has insightfully identified several failures with the New Originalists'

"empirical" approach to such translation. Gienapp, supranote 42, at 940-44. Perhaps closer to the mark

is Larry Lessig's approach. Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993). In
the constitutional context, Christina Mulligan and her co-authors have shown just how difficult this
process may be across different languages, even at the same historical moment. Christina Mulligan,
Michael Douma, Hans Lind, & Brian Quinn, FoundingEra Translationsofthe Constitution, 31 CONST.
COMMENT. 1 (2016). Indeed, Mulligan points to the nearly unanimous scholarly opinion that,
"Translation entails, and has always entailed, a process of analysis. Although this claim is intuitive,

establishing it is not trivial. The competing possibility-that translation is some rote process, where
word A in the source language becomes word A' in the in the target-come readily to mind." Id. at 11.
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resemblance" to itself across different historical language games. 48 Thus,
the word "commerce" is used today for many-but not all-of the same
purposes that it was in 1789. Our changing forms of life have attached new
meanings to the term, and other meanings have fallen away. 49 Wittgenstein
likened a word's uses across different language games to the individual
fibers that make up a piece of spun thread: Each fiber makes up an essential
part of the thread, but none spans its whole length." Put another way, each
use is necessary, but not sufficient, to establish a complete account of the
word's meaning. This means that "commerce" occupies different space
within the complex, evolving web of language rules that serve our modem
form of life than it did in older language games." The effort to transpose
an old term into our new practice thus requires choices about which
meanings to emphasize or cast aside-we must reshape 1789's "commerce"
to make it fit into our modem jigsaw puzzle-and these choices are, of
course, culturally normative and constructive in nature. As a result,
establishing even the communicative content of historical language within
a changed form of life is always a constructive, and not just an empirical,
endeavor.
These insights give rise to a number of difficult questions for
constitutional interpreters, especially those who seek determinate meanings
that might closely cabin judicial decision-making. Such individuals might
ask whether our games might at some point evolve so much that we can no
longer properly say we are playing "Gin"-or that we are still doing
"American constitutionalism." To assess this sort of question, we must
remember the fundamental insight already underfoot-neither the terms
"Gin" nor "American constitutionalism" refer to objects in the world that

4 INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 19, §§ 66-67. See also, Sean Wilson, The Fallacyof Originalism:
What Philosophy of Language and Law Says About 'Original Meanings, 14-15 Working Paper
availableat: http://ssm.com/abstract- 1405451.
4

Some years ago, Rick Hills put the point quite nicely in a post on Prawfsblawg:
Constitutional terms like "the rights ... retained by the people" refer not to some trans-

historical nugget of meaning, some referent like the Potomac River to which "the Potomac[k]

River" referred in 1791 and still refers today. Instead, such terms are ideologically loaded
markers referring to what Wittgenstein would call a "form of life"---a vast array of values,

beliefs, and points of salience that have often vanished long ago. Assuming that some judge
with the powers of Quentin Skinner actually succeeded in reconstructing this array of beliefs,
she would never enforce it, because it would be too unpalatable to the modem society that,
in the long run, chooses the judges.

Rick Hills, How Kurt Lash Cured Me of Originalism, PRAWFSBLAWG (Sept. 6, 2009),
http://www.typepad.com/services/trackback/6a00d8341c6a7953ef01 20a5419880970b.
50 Id. at § 67.
51 Id.
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we might use to verify their meanings. Instead, both terms identify their
own rule-governed social practices, and so the only way to answer our
question is to look at whether practitioners generally treat our evolving
actions or utterances as recognizable parts of their respective practices. If
so, we are still using the terms appropriately, even if the games have
changed in important ways.
Perhaps the most common kind of confusion on this point arises when
critics point to the American Constitution as the sort of foundational object
that can verify or falsify contested meanings within our practice of
constitutionalism. The claim here is that "the American Constitution" is a
proper noun, thus there is an object to which the term refers, and so our
"constitutionalism" must be bound to that reference point in some verifiable
way.52 Such a claim is certainly relevant if we are trying to distinguish the
American Constitution from some other document or object, but that is
rarely the communicative problem that people who make this argument are
trying to solve. Rather, they hope to use the Constitution's words as a
foundational and limiting source of constitutional meaning. But again,
many words do not refer to objects that can provide the sort of foundation
or limits these critics seek. As a result, the Constitution's text cannot speak
for itself: its meaning arises only as a product of a shared, rule-bound
communicative practice.5 3 While it is certainly true that the text may limit
constitutional meaning, it does so not by reference to objects or as a matter
of "fact," but rather because we impose those limits as part of a shared
interpretive practice.54 Once more (for good measure) the Constitution is

52 I take this to be the essence of those theories that rely in significant ways on the Constitution's
"writteness." See Andrew Coan, The Irrelevance of Writteness in ConstitutionalInterpretation, 128 U.
PA. L. REv. 1025 (2010) (canvassing theories).
5 In Philip Bobbitt's words, "Texts may speak, but they don't decide." Philip Bobbitt, The
Constitutional Canon, in LEGAL CANONS 331 (Jack Balkin & Sanford Levinson, eds. 2000). Or, in
Mitch Berman and Kevin Toh's formulation, "[T]ext is not itself law." Mitchell N. Berman & Kevin
Toh, On What DistinguishesNew Originalismfrom Old: A JurisprudentialTake, 82 FORD. L. REv. 545,
570 n. 82 (2013); accordMitchell N. Berman, Book Review, Judge Posner'sSimple Law, 113 MICH.
L. REv. 777, 804 n. 113 (2015) ("Text is not law, for they are different sorts of things. A text is an
assemblage of signs and symbols; a law is a normative entity.").
I I was once posed something like the following hypothetical: Imagine the Constitution provides
that the Presidential inauguration ceremony must be held outside if the temperature is "at or above 40
degrees." It is well known that the founding generation used Fahrenheit's temperature scale, but in the
intervening years the United States has switched over to the Centigrade system. As a result, based on
contemporary language conventions, the "Temperature Clause" now seems to require an outdoor
ceremony in extreme heat (at least 104 degrees Fahrenheit). Surely, my interlocutor suggested, this
problem demonstrates that we must adopt historical language conventions to make sense of the
constitutional text. My answer (though clumsy at the time) was that we would very likely translate the
historical meaning into modem terms with something like "5 degrees Centigrade," but that this would
be a matter of our shared interpretive practices-contemporary constitutional contestation and
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something we do, not something we have.
We might call this practice of constructing both semantic and legal
meaning "constitutionalism," and I suggest that it is this practice we are
most often referring to when we talk about "the Constitution."" To say, in
other words, that, "The Constitution does not permit #" is really to say
something like, "Our practice of constitutionalism does not recognize 0 as
legitimate." Consider, for example, Jack Balkin's observation that,
"[o]riginalism is mostly unknown outside of the United States."56 Unknown
even to our northern neighbors, so that even if Canadians had our
constitutional text as their written charter, their practical constitutionalism
would undoubtedly produce different meanings than those we know."
Again, it is the practice, not just the text, which bestows constitutional
meanings.
In the remainder of this essay, I will argue that the American practice
is one of contested constitutionalism, which is to say that in our
constitutional language game meanings often arise out of a contest. That is,
both the semantic and legal content of at least some significant
constitutional language are the product of a contest involving competing
assertions, arguments, and decisions. Wittgenstein teaches us that this
contest, like any language game, is rule-governed-some assertions and
arguments are legitimate and some are not-and these rules arise out of the
practical problems that shape our current constitutional forms of life. A
fundamental feature of this contest is the role that judicial decisions play in
settling particular disputes-at least temporarily-thus filling in gaps in
meaning that arise out of our changing forms of life. These decisions then
serve as something like the loophole-filling "examples" Wittgenstein
described in our language practices." Most importantly, the fact that our
constitutional language game often takes the form of a contest undermines
the relative semantic determinacy that the text can produce, particularly in

construction and there is nothing about the text itself which "represents" a particular temperature.
Indeed, although it seems unlikely, there is nothing illegitimateabout reading the Clause to reference 40
degrees Centigrade, so long as that is the meaning that our practical interpretive contestation settles
upon. In any case, this is an (likely uncontroversial) example of the sort of "evolutionary ambiguity"
discussed in Part II. A below.
" This might be something similar to the "disciplining rules" that Owen Fiss sees constraining
legal interpretation. Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation,34 STAN. L. REv. 739, 744 (1982).
56 Jack Balkin, "Why Are Americans Originalist?" in LAW, SOCIETY AND COMMUNITY: SOCIoLEGAL ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ROGER COrERRELL, (David Schiff & Richard Nobles, eds. 2015).
" On Canada's interpretive practices, see Peter Hogg, "Canada: From Privy Council to Supreme
Court" in INTERPRETING CONSTITUTIONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 55, 83 (Jeffrey Goldsworthy, ed.
2006). On "living tree" constitutionalism, see Edwards v. Attorney-General for Canada [1930] A.C.
124,9.
51 See note 22, supra and accompanying discussion.
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controverted cases. Knowing constitutional text, history, and even doctrine
is therefore insufficient to understand American constitutionalism without
understanding the current rules of the interpretive contest.
Philip Bobbitt's remarkable efforts to identify and describe these rules
provide a very valuable-if perhaps not entirely complete-picture of the
"grammar" of our constitutionalism.59
He has described a practice
composed of six distinct modalities of constitutional argument: textual,
historical, structural, doctrinal, prudential, and ethical.60 While these
modalities coexist as parts of the same larger practice, they remain
incommensurable in important respects-like Newtonian and Einsteinian
physics 6 1-which
is one important reason that our constitutionalism takes
the shape of an argumentative contest.62
This much Bobbitt has
demonstrated beyond much reasonable debate-even if there is still much
left to understand about how or why we choose one contested meaning over
another in particular cases.63 The next section, however, explores a different
set of questions. It uses comparisons to poker games to illustrate the
problems of indeterminacy that persist even within those modalities of
constitutional argument that adhere most closely to the constitutional text.
In other words, even if our constitutional practice were to evolve to
recognize only textual or historical arguments, constitutional meaning
would still be contested and indeterminate in a substantial number of cases.
II. CONTESTS OF AMBIGUITY AND VAGUENESS
While the accepted modalities of American constitutionalism are
undoubtedly a product of complex and ever-evolving social rule-following
practices, it seems likely that these interpretive practices generally reflect
some larger body of constitutional values near the center of our political
imaginations.' Certainly among those values is a strong desire that the

5 E.g., PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (Basil Blackwell, 1991); on
"grammar" see SEAN WILSON, THE FLEXIBLE CONSTITUTION 14-15 (2014).
6 BOBBITr, supra note 59, at 12-13.
61 The Newtonian terms 'force' and 'mass' provide the simplest sort of example. One cannot learn
how to use either one without simultaneously learning how to use the other. Nor can this part of the
language-acquisition process go forward with resort to Newton's Second Law of Motion. Only with its
aid can one learn to how to pick out Newtonian forces and masses, how to attach the corresponding
terms to nature." Kuhn, Rationality and Theory Choice, 80 J. PHIL. 563, 563 (1983); see also supra note
44.
62 BOBBITT, supra note 59, at 12-13. Bobbitt has further suggested that it is the existence of this
contest that justifies the institution of judicial review. If constitutional meanings were determinate, we
would hardly need a trained judiciary to interpret the document.
63 See e.g., lan Bartrum, ConstitutionalValue Judgments and Interpretive Theory Choice, 40 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV 259 (2012).
6 I have made this argument in more detail elsewhere. See Id.
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Constitution have determinate and discoverable meanings-meanings that
impose clear substantive limits on the government's structure and
authority. 5 To this end, there are those who would like to narrow the
acceptable range of our constitutional argumentative practices with the hope
of reducing the number or kind of our interpretive disagreements. 66 Indeed,
a particularly strong version of this claim might suggest that our practices
should evolve so as to treat prudential, ethical, structural, and doctrinal
arguments as presumptively illegitimate interpretive modalities. This
would mean that only textual and historical assertions could legitimately
inform the judicial decisions that fill in emergent gaps in our sense of
constitutional meaning. Even if such a drastic (and wildly imprudent)
change in our practice were to occur, however, constitutional meaning
would remain at least partially indeterminate and contested, our contests
would simply change their form or grammar. The chimera of the Umpire
Judge as bound conduit of constitutional truth would still run up short
against the inevitability of contested textual ambiguity and vagueness. 67
Ambiguity occurs when the rules of a language game allow us to use
the same term in at least two different ways-for example, a "right" answer

65 Associate Justice Antonin Scalia was perhaps the most prominent advocate (at least rhetorically)
of this sort of view, often telling audiences that the Constitution's text is "dead, dead, dead." E.g., Tasha
Tsiaperas, "Constitution a 'dead, dead, dead' document, Scalia tells SMU audience," DALLAS MORNING
http://www.dallasnews.com/news/community-news/park2013)
28,
(January
NEWS
cities/headlines/20130128-supreme-court-justice-scalia-offers-perspective-on-the-law-at-smulecture.ece

6 Id.

6' To be clear, this is not to surrender the constructive field entirely to the sorts ofsubjectivism that
characterized the realist or critical legal studies movements of the last century. See, e.g., Karl N.
Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory ofAppellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes
are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950) (deconstructing statutory interpretation); and THE
POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (David Kairys, ed. 1982) (anthologizing critical legal
studies scholarship). I recognize that the originalist revival of the 1980s was in many ways a direct
response to the profound anxieties those movements aroused, e.g. RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY
JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 402-6 (1977); ROBERT H.
BORK, THE TEMPT[NG OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 15-18 (1990), but it has
largely been a failed response.

In part for the reasons discussed herein, originalism simply cannot

provide the broad sorts of empirical constraints that its early proponents sought. Much more promising

in this regard is the contemporaneous work of people like Philip Bobbitt, Stanley Fish, and Owen Fiss,
which describes and analyzes the internal, practical constraints that arise out of our efforts to construct
constitutional meanings. PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE (1982) (suggesting that interpretive
practices constitute their own norms); STANLEY FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? (Harvard, 1980)
(arguing that meaning arises from the practices of "interpretive communities"); Owen M. Fiss,
Objectivity and Interpretation,34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982) (arguing that interpretive communities

generate "disciplining rules" for practitioners). My own views fall somewhere on the spectrum of these
latter scholars-with perhaps more emphasis on the role that adversarial interpretive contestation

plays-but those claims are not this essay's principal concern.
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or a "right" hand." Vagueness occurs when the language rules are
themselves underdetermined, so that there is uncertainty about whether it is
correct to use a particular term in a particular way-for example, we might
wonder whether or when it is appropriate to say that a friend is driving
"dangerously." 69 There are undoubtedly a lot of ways to think about
problems of legal indeterminacy,7 0 but, for contested constitutional
purposes, this essay draws two fundamental distinctions: An indeterminacy
may be either (1) contemporary or evolutionary; and it may be either (2)
intentionalor incidental." The first distinction suggests that constitutional

" See, e.g., Lawrence M. Solan, Vagueness and Ambiguity in Legal Interpretation,in VAGUENESS
IN NORMATIVE TEXTS 73, 79 (Vijay K. Bhatia, ed. 2005). The standard example compares a commercial
"bank" with a river "bank." Id.
69 See, e.g., H. PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS, 177 (Harvard, 1989).
70 See, e.g., TIMOTHY ENDICOTT, VAGUENESS
IN LAW (Oxford, 2000) (describing
multidimensional indeterminacy inherent in "extravagantly" vague terms like "reasonable"); Ralf
Poscher, Ambiguity and Vagueness in Legal Interpretation,in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LANGUAGE

AND LAW (Lawrence M. Solan & Peter M Tiersma, eds. 2012) (describing logical, ontological,
epistemological, and semantic approaches to vagueness); Scott Soames, Vagueness and the Law, in THE
ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (Andrei Marmor, ed. 2012) (positing "partial
definition theories" and "epistemic theories" of vagueness); Andrei Marmor, Varieties of Vagueness in

the Law, University of Southern California Legal Research Paper Series No. 12-8, available at:
http://papers.ssm.com /sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2039076 (differentiating "transparent" and
"extravagant" vagueness); Hrafn Asgeirsson, On the Instrumental Value of Vagueness in the Law, 125
ETHICS 425 (2015) (exploring problem of incommensurate multi-dimensionality) Brian H. Bix, Legal
Interpretation and the Philosophy ofLanguage, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LANGUAGE AND LAW
(Lawrence M. Solan & Peter M Tiersma, eds. 2012) (canvassing literature on indeterminacy and "opentextured" language); Brian H. Bix, "Vagueness and Political Choice in Law," in VAGUENESS AND THE
LAW: PHILOSOPHICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES (Geert Keil & Ralf Poscher, eds. Oxford Univ. Press
2016) (forthcoming, on file with author); Roy Sorensen, Vagueness Has No Function In Law, 7 LEGAL

THEORY 387 (2001).
Much of this scholarship has begun pulling from the philosophical end of the thread, using the
specific case of legal interpretation to better understand general linguistic principles.

Thus, some

theorists have debated the lessons that legal usages may have for existing philosophical accounts of
vagueness. Scott Soames, for example, has argued that the controversial "epistemic" theory of
vagueness (the precise borders of vague reference exist, but are not knowable) has very limited utility,

at least in legal practice. Andrei Marmor has explored the distinct sorts of problems that "ordinary,"
"transparent," and "extravagant" vagueness pose within the legal context. More law-oriented theorists
have begun to explore the sorts of instrumental values and purposes that linguistic indeterminacy may

serve in particular legal settings. Thus, folks like Timothy Endicott and Hrafn Asgeirsson have suggested
that vague language has certain instrumental value in statutory drafting: for example, it helps to avoid
certain types of arbitrariness and has a power-allocating function in certain kinds of controversies. Brian
Bix has suggested that statute or contract drafters may utilize indeterminate language to avoid the costs
associated with resolving disagreements up front, possibly with the hope that those indeterminacies do
not produce actual future disputes. Others, like Roy Sorensen, have argued that vagueness serves no

purpose at all in law, and we should thus work to avoid it whenever possible. My goal here is to begin
a discussion about the ways that textual indeterminacies both ensure and inform enduring constitutional
contests.
7

The concept ofan "incidental" indeterminacy may be similar to the more standard classification

of a "latent" ambiguity-where a text appears clear, but some extrinsic evidence renders the reference
uncertain. See, e.g., Gideon Rosen, Textualism, Intentionalism, and the Law of Contract, in
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text may be indeterminate at the moment it is ratified, or that it may become
indeterminate as our language practices evolve. The second recognizes that
such indeterminacies may be intentional, or they may be unavoidable or
unanticipated incidents of constitutional drafting and contested language. I
am principally concerned in what follows with two particular types of
indeterminacy: intentional contemporary ambiguity and incidental
vagueness. The former is a species of indeterminacy that New Originalism
largely ignores or brackets,72 while the latter does not seem susceptible to
empirical historical inquiry.
A. Evolutionaryand ContemporaryAmbiguities
Evolutionary ambiguities are generally the easiest to identify and
resolve. The word "text" offers a modern illustration. For many years,
"text" was primarily used to discuss written words. With the invention and
rapid ubiquity of cell phones, however, "text" is probably more often used
now to describe words sent electronically across a cellular data network.
Thus, as our forms of life have evolved, an assertion that would likely not
have been ambiguous twenty years ago certainly might be now. Perhaps
the most commonly cited example of an evolutionary ambiguity in
constitutional language is Article IV's promise of federal protection against
"domestic violence."73 At the time it was ratified, this language referred
unambiguously to intrastate hostilities or unrest; now, of course, the term is
most commonly used to describe spousal abuse. Thus, in our current
language practices it has become ambiguous. Evolutionary ambiguities of
this sort do not present much of a problem in language generally, or in our
constitutional practice. They are generally resolved without much contest
or controversy by looking to broadly shared historical practices and
contexts, and it is not worth spending more time on them here.

PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE IN THE LAW, 130, 156 (Andrei Marmor & Scott Soames,

eds., 2011). 1, however, intend the "incidental" label to include both this circumstance and those where
the text, on its face, is unintentionally indeterminate.
72 See SOLUM, supra note 9, at 102 (bracketing "irreducible" ambiguity).
7 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. For an interesting discussion of this example, see e.g. Mark S. Stein,
The Domestic Violence Clause in "New Originalist"Theory, 37 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 129 (2009).
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Contemporary ambiguities, however, present a more difficult case of
indeterminacy. This type of ambiguity occurs when contemporaneous
language conventions allow us to use the same term to make at least two
different references. In such a circumstance, the term's meaning is
potentially indeterminate at the moment it is uttered. One of Wittgenstein's
favorite drawings-the "duck-rabbit"-provides a simple illustration.
Though he usually used it for other purposes,
the image captures the problem of
contemporary ambiguity quite nicely. 74 If
one takes the animal to be facing left, then it
depicts a duck. If, however, one imagines
that the creature is facing right, it becomes a
rabbit. Without further clues or instructions
from the artist, the viewer is left to construct
the drawing's symbolic meaning on her
own-either as a duck, a rabbit, or both. In the constitutional context, the
word "arms" (for shooting or hugging?) in the Second Amendment provides
a comparable example. There are several ways we might resolve this sort
of ambiguity-contextual or pragmatic enrichment, authorial intentions, or
popular opinion, among others-each of which are, of course, subject to
construction and debate. But this is just the beginning. It is also important
to understand how this relatively simple problem may become far more
complex when contemporary ambiguities function within a nuanced
network of contested language practices-within which a speaker might
gain certain advantages by using terms ambiguously.75 This requires a
correspondingly richer illustration, which brings us back to the world of
cards.
Omaha Hi/Lo is a very popular poker game around the world. Each
player is dealt four "private" cards, which only she may see. Five
"communal" cards-which every player may use-are then dealt face down
in the center of the table. Betting continues in stages as the communal cards

7 Wittgenstein most famously used the "duck-rabbit" as a way of illustrating the cognitive
experience of "seeing as," or perceiving an aspect of something that one had not seen before.
INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 19, at 194e. Would that he had lived to see the debate over the infamous
"blue and black" or "white and gold" dress. See Jonathan Mahler, The Dress That Melted the Internet,
N.Y. TIMES, BI (Feb. 28, 2015).
" If it turns out, for example, that the picture was meant to depict both a duck and a rabbit (which,
in fact, seems likely) this becomes an intentional indeterminacy. In that case, we would likely want to
know why the artist was deliberately ambiguous-what purposes this might have served-and whether
the indeterminacy formed part of a contested communicative practice. These sorts of inquiries are likely
unavailable within public meaning originalism.
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are gradually revealed. In the first stage, known as the "Pre-Flop," the
players evaluate the potential strength of their hands based solely on their
private cards, and bet accordingly. The dealer then turns over the first three
communal cards-the "Flop"-and the players reassess and bet again.
Another communal card, known as the "Turn" is revealed, followed by
more betting. After the final communal card-the "River"-is turned the
players make their final bets, and the hands are revealed. Each player must
compose a five-card poker hand using both of their private cards and three
of the communal cards.
The object of the game is to have either the "high" hand or the "low"
hand-which then split the pot-or, if you are really good, both. To that
end, each player may compose two separate hands from the available
cards-one intended to compete for the high hand, and one for the low. To
qualify as a low hand, however, the five cards must include nothing higher
than a seven, and if no such hands exist the high hand takes the entire pot.
Sometimes, however, the same five-card hand can be both the high and the
low hand, which is known as a "scoop." This is possible because straights
and flushes count in high hands, but not in low hands.
The rules of Omaha Hi/Lo thus illustrate not only the basic problem of
contemporary ambiguity-in which multiple cards have ambiguous
contextual meanings-but also the complexities of contested contemporary
ambiguities. That is, a player can choose which ambiguous meaning to
give a card, hand, or suit in order to best serve her interests in the context of
a particular contest; and, in fact, she may choose to use both meanings
within the same hand. With this in mind, her opponent must produce a
strategy that accounts for each of these potential meanings, at least
inasmuch as they appear in the communal cards. This adds significant
complexity to contemporary ambiguity as a source of intentional
indeterminacy. The possibility of these sorts of motivated choices also leads
us naturally into a discussion of incidentaland intentionalambiguity.
B. Incidental andIntentional Ambiguities
There is little doubt that some ambiguous usages are unavoidable, or
at the very least, unintentional. For example, the fact that both players in a
game of Omaha Hi/Lo might have completed the best possible low handthey might each have held the lowest cards in different suits7 6-is simply an
76 Note that even this sentence produces a contemporary ambiguity with the phrase
"of different
suits": Different from the other cards in the player's hand, or different from the cards in her opponent's
hand? A bit of contextual enrichment, however, suggests the latter meaning, as suits are of no
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incidental feature of the game's rules. In such a circumstance, the players
split the low pot, but neither reaps a benefit from the ambiguous rules that
recognize two possible "nut" low hands.
Likewise, in a recent study of founding era translations of the
Constitution, Christina Mulligan and her co-authors have identified several
incidental contemporary ambiguities in the text.77 These translationsmade for distribution to the Dutch and German communities in
Pennsylvania during the ratification debates-evince some notable
ambiguities in the text's original meaning. For example, the meaning of the
controverted verb "to regulate" in the Commerce Clause was rendered
differently in the two languages:
[The Dutch translator] chose a Dutch cognate of the English
word. In Dutch, 'regulate' or 'reguleeren' means subject to
imposition of rules or control, or to supervise. However, the
German translator chose the verb 'einrichten,' a somewhat
ambiguous term, which could mean any of: to establish something
previously nonexistent, to furnish something existing, or to
establish oneself somewhere. (For comparison, the translator could
have used the word 'regulieren,' which means to subject something
to rules or to control, now commonly used in the European
Union.)"
While this particular ambiguity is highly relevant to the historical
arguments made in NFIB v. Sebelius-which centered on whether the power
to "regulate" commerce empowers Congress to bring about commercial
activity 79-there is little evidence that the differing translations demonstrate
any intentional choice by the framers or ratifiers.so Thus, at least based on
the evidence we have, this sort of contemporary ambiguity is of the
incidental variety. That does not make it unproblematic, of course-it still
requires constructive decision-making by an interpretive community (of the
sort noted in the "duck-rabbit" discussion)-but it presents fewer, or at least

consequence within an individual's low hand.
n Mulligan et. al., supra note 47.
* Id at 25.
* NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
80 See Mulligan et. al, supra note 47, at 52-53 ("[S]emantic dissociation between the two
translations can be understood as either an example of differing interpretations, or as the contingent
result of the translation process as a more or less conscious and controlled activity that inevitably leads
to differences and even errors. The latter possibility might often be the case with these translators'
work.").
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different, complexities than would an intentional ambiguity.
This brings us finally to the problem of intentional contemporary
ambiguities, which are those utilized to promote their user's ends within a
particular contest." The ambiguous usages of cards that could contribute to
either high or low hands in the Omaha Hi/Lo example demonstrate this
phenomenon in the context of card game. The practice is certainly also a
part of American constitutionalism, as illustrated in the earlier story about
Senators Cruz and Feinstein about the proposed assault weapons ban. The
question, then, is why would the drafters be intentionally ambiguous? What
advantage might have been gained in our contested constitutional practice
by intentionally using the term "the people" ambiguously? The answer may
be fairly straightforward. Using "the people" to refer to both the larger and
smaller groups of citizens had at least two purposes. First, it continued the
argumentative effort to legitimize the Constitution as the act of as broad a
popular sovereign as possible, while functionally limiting political rights to
a much smaller subset of the population. Second, by using the aspirationally
inclusive term, the language set up an enduring constitutional contest about
which citizens should enjoy full membership in the American political
project.
The "people" like the Declaration of Independence's "all men" of
equal creation was very much like an Ace of Clubs in a hand of Omaha
Hi/Lo. It had both a "high" meaning-the aspirational appeal to universal
equality before the law-and a "low" functional meaning, encompassing
only an elite subset of citizens.82 Senator Cruz utilized the more inclusive
modem meaning of "the people," which has largely won the constitutional
contest set up in the original text. Perhaps ironically, he was able to make
a non-originalist argument about constitutional meaning by taking
advantage of the intentional contemporary textual ambiguity in the framers'
language.
Several types of ambiguity, then, make some contests over the text's
semantic and legal meaning inevitable. The simplest of these contests might
arise over incidental evolutionary ambiguities-such as "domestic
violence"-which seem unlikely to provoke much actual debate. Incidental
contemporary ambiguities present more difficult problems, however,
" Some philosophical accounts suggest that ambiguities are almost never intentional. See Marmor,
supranote 70. This may, then, be an example of a circumstance in which constitutional law differs from
other kinds of communicative practices.
82 For more on the Declaration's "aspirational" and "functional" meanings, see Ian Bartrum, The
ConstitutionalCanon As Argumentative Metonymy, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 327 (2009). The
same sort of aspirational ambiguity exists in the Fourteenth Amendment's promise of equal protection
to "any person." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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particularly for historical arguments that make claims based solely on
original public meanings. Whether the German translation of 'to regulate'
as 'einrichten' is evidence of a broader public meaning than some modem
interpreters have supposed, for example, is certainly ground for a fairly
robust modem constitutional contest. The most complex sources of
ambiguous indeterminacy, however, are intentional contemporary
ambiguities.
These are circumstances in which the text's authors
deliberately used language in ways that the relevant public would have
found ambiguous. Such usages purposefully establish the grounds for
future debate and disputation, and confirm that constitutional meaningeven within the confines of a severely limited interpretive practice-must
remain the product of an ongoing practical contest.
C. Incidental Vagueness
Vagueness is a different type of indeterminacy than ambiguity. An
ambiguous term may be used to make at least two different references, but
the referents themselves are generally not indeterminate. Thus, in Omaha
Hi/Lo there is no confusion about what meaning attaches to the "highest"
or "lowest" cards in the deck per the rules of the game; nor is there much
historical debate about which groups of "people" held full political rights at
the time of constitutional ratification. Not so with a vague term, however,
which occupies indeterminate space within the rules of the language game
itself. Consequently, in borderline cases a vague usage fails to identify a
determinate referent, and so leaves the truth or falsity of a proposition open
to interpretive contestation. Thus, we might reasonably agree or disagree
with the assertion that lethal injection is a "cruel" form of punishment.
Most instances of intentional vagueness have both "contemporary"
and "evolutionary" dimensions ("cruel punishment" was intentionally
vague in 1789, and was likely intended to be vague within different
parameters today), and these changing boundary lines are the focus of much
debate.8 3 Intentional vagueness is not, however, the focus of this paper, as
I hope instead to draw attention to problems of incidental vagueness.
Incidental vagueness, like incidental ambiguity, reflects the practical limits
of contested language and the drafting process. A more precise term-one
that invokes more specific linguistic rules-may be unavailable, or the
drafters may be unable to agree on more exacting language. I will call this
a case of incidental contemporary vagueness. Alternatively, the drafters

83

See Marmor, supra note 67.
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may not recognize the potential vagueness in a term they choose to employ.
I will call this incidentalevolutionary vagueness, though we might also call
it "latent" vagueness in keeping with some of the literature on ambiguity.84
This latter form of vagueness, in particular, deserves considerably more
attention.
Another Wittgenstein-based example illustrates the problem with a
question: "How many pieces of wood are in a broom?"" The answer that
springs immediately to most minds is "one"-there is just the wooden
handle. But there is actually a latent vagueness here; the answer depends
upon what you think constitutes a "piece of wood" and/or a "broom," which
in turn depends on how you want to use the wood or the broom. If you need
two shorter pieces of wood, you could, of course, break the handle in half.
If you need 100 toothpicks, you might fimd a way to reduce the handle to
splinters.
Apparently, prison inmates sometimes deconstruct broom
handles and turn them into zip guns." If you just need a broom, or if you
simply think a "broom" consists of a wooden handle of a certain length and
its attached bristles, then you are probably back to the answer "one." The
larger point is that we may not see the potential vagueness in a term until a
practical problem arises (such as the need for toothpicks) that draws out the
underlying indeterminacy.
Another poker example may be helpful. Imagine you are watching a
game of Five Card Draw on television. There are three players, and each
has already exercised their option to draw new cards. The television
broadcast allows you to see all three hands: Player I's highest hand is a pair
of 5's; Player 2 has three Jacks; and Player 3 has three Aces. Imagine that,
at that moment, you are asked which player has the "worst" hand. Most
people would likely answer, reflexively, that Player l's pair of 5's is worst.
But, again, there is a potential vagueness here, which arises out of the
practical problems that contested betting strategies bring into the game.
Player 1, knowing her lowly 5's are unlikely to win, is likely to fold her
hand without risking any further money. Player 2, on the other hand,
probably feels pretty good about his three Jacks, and is likely to risk more

8 In contract or estate law, for example, a "latent" ambiguity is one that may arise out of changed
circumstances. For example, although a testator had only one nephew named Lester at the time her will
was executed, two such nephews existed at her death. In such a circumstance parol evidence may be

admissible to resolve the ambiguity. Extrinsic evidence, however, would not seem helpful to a case of
latent vagueness.
" See INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 19, § 60 (discussing whether the word "broom" refers to all the
constituent parts, or just the whole).
6 BEV CHRISTENSEN & LAURA ZIELKE, GRAB THE DEVIL'S TAIL: CONFESSIONS OF A CONVICT
TURNED POLICE INFORMANT 89 (2007).
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money by increasing his bets against Player 3. In the end, assuming Player
3 stays in, Player 2 will lose that money. One could certainly make a case,
given these probabilities, that Player 2 actually has the "worst" hand at the
moment you are asked to decide.17 How much lower would Player 2's hand
have to get before he, too, would fold and cut his losses early? A pair of
10's? A pair of 7's? At whatever point that is-and that, of course, is open
to debate-most people would likely agree that Player l's hand has
definitively become the "worst" of the three, for most people, the initial
question contains an incidental or latent vagueness that future contestation
may reveal. It is the question "Worst in what way?" that reveals the latent
vagueness of "worst" hand.
Incidental evolutionary vagueness often occurs in the constitutional
context as well. As an example, we might consider the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion."" In particular, the use of the word "respecting"
produces what is likely an incidental vagueness. Justice Clarence Thomas
has argued that the First Congress chose the word "respecting" because its
intention was to prevent Congress from interfering with the existing
religious establishments in the various states.89 In this sense, the word
"respecting" means something like "affecting," and the Establishment
Clause was intended as a federalism provision reserving to the state
governments the power to either establish or disestablish an official church.
When the Court began to incorporate various provisions of the Bill of
Rights against the states, however, the Clause's federalism meaning had to
evolve. After all, it makes no sense for an incorporated Establishment
Clause to deny the states the very power the original Clause had specifically
reserved to them. So "respecting" began to change from "affecting" into
"effecting," and the Clause came to prohibit the states not only from
establishing a church, but also from taking certain steps in that direction.
To wit, in the seminal Establishment case of the twentieth century-Lemon
v. Kurtzman-Chief Justice Burger could claim that, "[a] given law might
not establish a church but nevertheless be one 'respecting' that end in the
sense of being a step that could lead to such establishment and hence offend

" I must thank my colleague Peter Bayer for this example.
8 U.S. CONST. amend, I.
89
E.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 50 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing
AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 36-39 (1998)). Where
Justice Thomas seems to part company with Amar, however, is when the latter recasts the Establishment
Clause's "reconstructed" meaning following the Civil War. For Amar, an intense constitutional contest

had dramatically reshaped the Clause, so that it came to guarantee an individual and not a state tight.
AMAR, supra at 249-54.
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the First Amendment." 90
Exactly which steps might "respect" an
Establishment end, of course, remains open to interpretive debate. The
ongoing contest over the Establishment Clause's meaning, then, has brought
to the surface a textual vagueness that the First Congress likely did not
anticipate.
Two cases of incidental evolutionary vagueness were also at the center
of the Court's recent decision in NLRB v. Noel Canning, which challenged
the constitutionality of several executive appointments to the National
Labor Relations Board." The text in question was the President's Article
II authority to make unilateral appointments to fill "vacancies that may
happen during the recess of the Senate."92 When the Senate took its
customary holiday break in December of 2011, Republicans were wary that
the President might try to push through several appointments upon which
the Senate had refused to act.93 With this in mind, they passed a resolution
"providing for a series of pro forma sessions, with no business transacted,
every Tuesday and Friday through January 20, 2012," so that a formal recess
would not occur.94 The President made the appointments anyway, and the
Court was asked to decide whether the word "recess" included customary
intra-session breaks (like Christmas), or just the formal break between
sessions of Congress.95 Further, the challengers argued that the phrase
"vacancies that may happen" referred only to positions that become open
while the Senate is in recess, not to those that opened up before the break
began.96 The Court decided in the President's favor on both questions, but
nonetheless concluded that the pro forma sessions kept the Senate from
going into intra-session recess over the holiday.97
Again, there is no evidence that the framers were intentionally vague
in adopting the recess appointments language," but a potentially unforeseen
use of this Executive power arose fairly quickly within the politics of
contested constitutionalism. Thomas Jefferson, as the first overtly "party"

9 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971)(emphasis added).
91
NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. _, 134 S.Ct. 2550, 2556 (2014). As noted above, the Court
itself refers to these indeterminacies as "ambiguous," Id. at 2561, but according to the stipulated
definitions common in the literature, they are actually cases of vagueness. To wit, there is no question
about the sorts of things a "recess" or a "vacancy" are, rather the question is whether the relevant
phenomena are cases of "recess" or "vacancy."
92

Id. at 2556.
2557.

9 Id. at
94 Id.

95 Id.
96

Id.

9 Id.
9 See JAMES MADISON, JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 681-82 (1898).
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President, "managed to appoint 120 officers during a single Senate recess,
including 30 judges in the newly created courts for the District of
Columbia."9 9 And a century later Theodore Roosevelt would elevate the
recess appointment to an art form when he appointed 168 officers-some
very unpopular among Southern Senators-during the "split second"
between two consecutive legislative sessions." Over the past half century,
as judicial confirmations have become more politicized and the Senate has
become increasingly intransigent, the recess appointment power has
become a standard tool in the Executive kit-reaching a high water mark in
the 1980s, which saw Ronald Reagan make 243 recess appointments.0 1 But
the Senate has since pushed back by holding pro forma sessions to prevent
recess, and some presidents responded by using three-day weekends to push
through controversial appointees.
Thus, changes in our constitutional
forms of life have made us revisit constitutional language and have revealed
a latent vagueness in the original text.
Like ambiguity, then, the existence of several types of vagueness
entails that the text's semantic meaning must sometimes arise out of
constructive contestation. Some of this vagueness is undoubtedly a product
of intentionally indeterminate usages on the part of the constitutional
speakers. This sort of vagueness is the source of a great deal of modern
contestation, and even the New Originalists (necessarily) concede that such
cases are not particularly susceptible to empirical semantic constraints.
Less discussed, however, are cases of incidental or latent vagueness, which
occur either when the speakers could not agree on a more precise term, or
when emergent constitutional problems reveal unforeseen textual
vagueness. I suggest that this last type of vagueness is particularly
undertheorized, even though it is significant source of constitutional
controversy. When considered alongside the problems of ambiguity
discussed above, these issues of vagueness demonstrate that there are
number of significant cases in which the text cannot provide an empirical
constraint on constitutional meaning.
D.

The Limits ofPublic Meaning Originalism

I suggest that the thought experiment of a constitutional practice
limited to the historical and textual interpretive modalities helps to
" JeffVanDam, The Kill Switch: The New Battle Over PresidentialRecess Appointments, 107 Nw.

U. L. REv. 361, 370 (2012).
'0' Id. at 371.
101 Id.
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demonstrate that the text's semantic meaning must often arise from
constructive contestation. The table below helps to emphasize the scope and
importance of the limitations that these indeterminacies entail for public
Upon examination, of the seven types of
meaning originalism.
indeterminacy indicated, only the two types of incidental ambiguity would
seem to benefit much from analysis of original public meaning-and even
these, only contingently so.
TYPES OF INDETERMINACY

INCIDENTAL

INTENTIONAL

EVOLUTIONARY

CONTEMPORARY

Ai

i
Ambiguity: "Omaha Hi/Lo';
"Ted Cruz"
Vagueness: "Due process";

Vagueness: "Due Process";

"Cruel Pumishment"

"Cruel Pumishment'

Public meaning originalism, particularly Larry Solum's work, has
done much to analyze and clarify the difference between ambiguity and
vagueness in constitutional explication, but the problems of intentional
contemporary ambiguity and incidental vagueness suggest that these
advances may have come at the cost of constructive constraint. According
to the New Originalists, ambiguity is generally encountered in the
"interpretation" phase of explication, where it is usually overcome as an
empirical matter.102 This may be generally true of evolutionary ambiguities
("domestic violence"), which often require only straightforward recourse to
broad convergences in historical language practices. It might also be trueperhaps contingently-of incidentalcontemporary ambiguities (Dutch and
German translations of "to regulate"), when there is enough uncontroversial
contextual evidence available to make resort to authorial intentions
unnecessary-though even this would require constructive translation. It is
difficult to see, however, how it could be true of intentionalcontemporary
ambiguities, which were used to further their authors' ends in a particular

102 Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role ofHistoricalFact in OriginalMeaning, 91
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1, 11-12 (2015); see also Solum, supra note 9, at n. 25.
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political contest. These sorts of ambiguities-being, after all, intentionalwould seem to require constructive recourse to drafters' intent, and a good
deal more construction regarding the relevant historical contest.1 03 This
hardly seems to be the sort of communicative content we might hope to
establish as a matter of linguistic fact.
In the case of intentional vagueness, it may be that the distinction
between contemporary and evolutionary indeterminacy is not particularly
helpful. In such circumstances, the communicative parameters of a
controverted term may be fuzzy along shifting fault lines, but the basic
interpretive problems remain the same. The role that historical practices
might play in guiding our construction of vague terms, however, would
seem to be quite different depending on whether we are dealing with
intentionalor incidental phenomena. On the one hand, the potential scope
of intentional vagueness may be constrained or delimited by broad
convergences in historical legal or linguistic conventions. We might, for
example, derive some constructive guidance from "paradigm cases" or
"expected applications"; and (if we are willing to go beyond public
meanings) we might even eliminate some meanings as plainly
unintended." Incidental vagueness, however, seems much less susceptible
to historical guidance or constraint, at least in the two forms described
above. First, if the authors used a vague term because they could not agree
on a more precise term, or because none was available, the best we might
hope to accomplish historically (and, again, only if we are willing to resort
to intentionalism) is to divine something about the scope of their
disagreement. Otherwise, the history is just as indeterminate as the text.
Second, if an unforeseen vagueness arises over the course of time, as our
world and constitutional problems change, it is difficult to see what insight
the ratifying history might provide. This sort of incidental vagueness-like
a Kuhnian paradigm shift-is simply a product of our evolving forms of
life, on which historical language practices can provide very little, if any,
useful guidance.
CONCLUSION

The last two decades have seen an explosion in scholarship exploring
the intersection between linguistic indeterminacy (usually vagueness), as

.o3 This move, of course, is unavailable to public meaning originalists.
On "paradigm cases," see JED RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY: THE STRUCTURE OF
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Harvard Univ. Press, 2005). On "expected applications," see e.g.,
Michael McConnell, Originalism and the DesegregationDecisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947 (1995).
1
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analyzed within the philosophy of language, and legal interpretive theory.os
I have suggested that such indeterminacies are an inevitable, and even
valuable, part of contested language games, which exploit linguistic
uncertainty to further different communicative or political ends. I have
further suggested that two particular types of constitutional
indeterminacy-intentional contemporary ambiguity and incidental
evolutionary vagueness-present substantial problems for public meaning
theories of constitutional originalism. Resolving an intentional ambiguity
seems to require at least some recourse to authorial intentions-which are
beyond the scope of public meaning originalism-and historical usages can
offer little guidance when new constitutional problems reveal a latent
textual vagueness.
When combined with cases of intentional vagueness-which the
New Originalists already concede to modem construction-these types of
indeterminacy seriously undermine the practical value of public meaning
originalism as an interpretive method. Indeed, many-if not most-of our
nontrivial constitutional disputes are contests over just these sorts of textual
uncertainties. In all of these cases, then, the public meaning originalist must
either resort to intentionalist theories-with all of their well-known
epistemological and jurisprudential problems 10 6-or concede the question
to modem judicial construction. This, in turn, means that public meaning
originalism's claims about the existence of "empirical" constraints on our
constructive practices can inform only a small, and relatively
uncontroversial, set of actual constitutional controversies.'
In the end,
however, this need not arouse the sorts of existential anxieties that beset the
onginalists of the 1980s,"os because the constitutional contest itself
generates deeper and more enduring constraints on constitutional meaning
than any posited theory ever could.

"o See Marmor, supra note 67.
0 See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Misconceived Questfor the OriginalUnderstanding,60 B.U. L. REV.

204, 209-17 (1980) (discussing the difficulty of discovering intent, and the weakness of individual or
institutional intent's claim to legal authority).
'0 This does not, of course, mean that we cannot or should not be originalists; but it does mean
that a robust conception of "original communicative content" may require recourse to original intentions,

and so will not be "empirical" in the sense the New Originalists hope.
1os See Edwin Meese, III, Speech Before the American Bar Association, Washington, D.C. (July 9,
1985) ("A Constitution that is viewed as only what the judges say it is, is no longer a constitution in the
true sense"), reprinted in ORIGINALISM: THE QUARTER-CENTURY OF DEBATE 47, 53 (Steven G.

Calabresi ed., 2007).

